خاني چهري محمد كرمانشاه

پرسش هاي  حمل ونقل بين المللي 99-98-1

1- بارگنج (Container) را باز شناسي (تعريف) كنيد وگونه هاي آن را نام ببريد.

2- گونه هاي كشتي هاي ويژه  ترابري (حمل)  بارگنج (Container) و كشتي هاي (Huckepach RoRo & Roll on Roll off) را گزيده بر شمريد.

3- بارنامه حمل (Bill of Lading) را باز شناسي (تعريف) كنيد وگونه هاي  به كاركرد آن را نام ببريد .

4- فرايند ترابري بين المللي و عوامل درگير در آن را گزيده شرح دهيد .

5- برگردان  پارسي هريك از اصطلاحات رايج زبان اصلي در بارنامه حمل را به شرح زيرين بيابيد :

نام و نشاني حمل كننده كالا / نام و نشاني فرستنده كالا / نام و نشاني گيرنده كالا/ نام و نشاني ابلاغ شونده / نام مبداء بارگيري يا دريافت كالا/ شمارگان نسخ اصلي/ امضاء حمل كننده يا نماينده مجاز وي/ نام شركت كشتيراني/ کسي که كالا به نام او ارسال شده (گيرنده كالا) / به حواله كرد / نام كشتي ترابري كننده كالا/ نام بندر حمل يا بارگيري يا مبداء / كرايه حمل پيشتر پرداخت شده يا در مقصد قابل پرداخت است/ نام ونشاني كامل نماينده كشتي راني يا شركت ترابر در بندر مقصد براي دريافت برگ تحويل كالا/ امضاء ناخداي كشتي/ نسخ كامل بارنامه.

Carrier Address / Shipper Address / Consignee Address / Notify Address/ Place of loading or receipt of cargo / Number of original / Signature of carrier or his authorized agent.

Name of the Shipping Co/ consignee/ to the order of/ Name of the carrying ocean vessel/ Port of loading or shipment origin /Port of discharge or Destination/ Freight prepaid or payable at destination or collect at destination / Name and address of the shipping company or transporter’s representative or agent at the port of Destination for taking delivery order/ Signed for the master/ Full set Bill of Lading.

6- كاربست و كاركرد ترابري و مدارك مورد نياز آن را پيش از بارگيري كالاشرح دهيد

7- فرايند كسر تخليه را شرح دهيد و ميزان جريمه مقرر را در مورد كالاي مجاز بيان كنيد.

8- فرايند اضافه تخليه را شرح دهيد و ميزان جريمه مقرر را بيان كنيد.

9- به هنگام كسرتخليه، وظيفه صاحب كالاي اعتبار اسنادي (خريدار) با بانك گشايش كننده اعتبار و گمرك چگونه است؟

10- مقررات موارد مسئوليت متصدي حمل در جبران خسارت را شرح دهيد.

11- چگونگي برآورد خسارات و مبلغ مورد ادعاي بيمه گر از متصدي حمل كالا را شرح دهيد.

12- سقف گزينش شده بيشينه مسئوليت خسارات احتمالي متصدي حمل را شرح دهيد.

13- مهلت قانوني جهت دريافت خسارت از متصدي حمل كالا را گزيده شرح دهيد.

14- مهلت‌هاي قانوني اعتبار بارنامه حمل بر اساس پيمان هاي (Convention) معتبر و رايج مقررات لاهه» ، the Hague-Visby rule Hague rules » و مقررات هامبورگ Hamburg Rule/»

» را گزيده شرح دهيد.

15- حواله تحويل (Delivery order)مشهور به ترخيصيه» را باز شناسي (تعريف)كنيد.

16- گذر داخلي (Internal Transit) را باز شناسي (تعريف) كرده وگونه هاي آن را شرح دهيد.

17- شرايط صاحب كالاي بازرگاني (شخص حقيقي /حقوقي )در گمرك را باز شناسي (تعريف)كنيد وجايگزيني او را در بارنامه شرح دهيد.

- ترانزيت خارجي وفرايند آن را باز شناسي كنيد.

19- قاچاق گمركي را باز شناسي كنيد و يكي از نمادهاي (مصاديق) آن را شرح دهيد وهم پوشاني هاي آن را در فرايند حمل تحليل محتوي كنيد.

20- تخلفات گمركي ناشي از فرايند ترابري بازرگاني بين المللي را بيان كنيد.

21- فهرست كل بار (مانيفست/ Manifest ) را شرح دهيد.

22- اظهار نامه اجمالي (General declaration) را شرح دهيد.

23- فرايند بارشماري ومشخصات برگ بارشماري (تالي/ Tally) را شرح دهيد.

24- چگونگي پراكنش  (انتقال) مالكيت كالا را در بارنامه حمل شرح دهيد.

25- دو اصطلاح رايج فرستنده كالا (Forwarder) و ترابر (حمل) كننده (Carrier) را شرح دهيد.

26- مشخصات كامل قبض انبار را بنويسيد.

27- بارنامه‌ كهنه (Stale) و غير قابل پذيرش براي بانك ها را باز شناسي كنيد.

28- بارنامه آورنده (حامل/ (Bearer Bill of lading را شرح دهيد.

29- بارنامه سرراست  (مستقيم The straight Bill of Lading ) را شرح دهيد.

30- بارنامه به حواله كرد (To order/ To the order of) B.L را شرح دهيد.

31- نسخ اصلي اسناد حمل( Original Shipping Document) وبارنامه غير قابل معامله(Non negotiation) را شرح دهيد.

32- سياهه خريد (invoice) را بازشناسيد ونمايه (مشخصه) هاي آن را به پارسي - انگليسي نام ببريد .

33- بارنامه ترابري دريايي On Board B/L را شرح دهيد.

34- بارنامه ترابري دريايي( Clean B/L  ) بدون عيب و نقض و بدون قيد و شرط را شرح دهيد.

35- بارنامه نا سالم و داراي عيب و نقص(Un clean B/ L) را شرح دهيد.

36- متن زبان اصلي زير را به پارسي برگردانيد و اصطلاح (FOB : Free on Board) را با توجه متن پيش گفته  تحليل محتوا كنيد .

FOB : Free on Board ( … named port of shipment) Free on Board” means that the seller delivers when the goods pass the ships rail at the named port of shipment. This means that the buyer has to bear all costs and risks of lose of or damage to the goods from that point. The FOB term requires the seller to clear the goods for export. This term can be used only for sea or inland water way transport. If the parties do not (intend) deliver the goods across the ship’s rail. The FCA terms should be used. (Incoterms 2000 : P.49)

37- بارنامه دريايي داراي نسخ كامل مبين حمل كالا روي عرشه كشتي(Full set clean on Deck B/L) را شرح دهيد.

38- بارنامه دريايي سوم شخص(شخص ثالث/ Third party B/L) را شرح دهيد.

39- بارنامه سراسري (Full set clean through B/L) بدون عيب و نقص داراي نسخ كامل را شرح دهيد.

40- رسيد نماينده ترابري زميني(Forwarding Agents Certificate of receipt: F.C.R)) را شرح دهيد.

41- اسناد ترابري مركب (Combined Transport Documents) را شرح دهيد و ناهمساني هاي آن را با ديگر بارنامه ها همسنجي كنيد.

42- بارنامه حمل مركب فياتا(FBL) را باز شناسانيد و ويژگي هاي آن را بررسي كنيد.

43- چگونگي صدور بارنامه دريايي  را شرح دهيد.

44- قلمرو مسئوليت صادركننده بارنامه را شرح دهيد.

45- گردش كار بارنامه حمل را شرح دهيد.

46- فرايند پيمان (Convention) ، (TIR: Transport International Road )، را شرح دهيد و ويژگي هاي آن را بررسي كنيد.

47- دفترچه تير(TIR Carnet) را شرح داده ، اجزاء آن ، مشخصات روي جلد وشرايط كامل آن را بيان كنيد.

48- مدارك مورد نياز براي صدور دفترچه (TIR Carnet) در واردات وصادرات را نام ببريد.

49- پيمان(Convention merchandise per route (CMR) را شرح دهيد.

Route: send by a specific route, direct along a particular path; mark a route, chart a course

50- راهنامه(CMR )را  شرح دهيد و ويژگي و محدوديت هاي آن را در پراكنش (انتقال ) مالكيت كالا بررسي كنيد.

51- پيمان بين المللي آسان سازي آمد وشد دريايي مشهور به (FAL -  Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic) را شرح دهيد.

52- كنوانسيون باز نگري شده كيوتو (Revised Kyoto convention)را شرح دهيد

53- جواز هاي عبور بين المللي كارنه دوپاساژ و تريپتيك» براي وسايط نقليه موتوري مسافران يا سياحان را شرح دهيد.

54- متن زير را به پارسي برگردانيد.

The Convention on International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention) was made at Geneva on 14 November 1975 to simplify and harmonize the administrative formalities of international road transport.

The TIR system not only covers customs transit by road but a combination is possible with other modes of transport (for example, rail, inland waterway and even maritime transport), as long as at least one part of the total transport is made by road.

The TIR Carnet has a number of sets (pairs) of detachable vouchers (in French, volets”) numbered 1 (white) and 2 (green). Normally one pair of vouchers (white and green) is needed for the transport of goods across the territory of each TIR operational country. The vouchers are filled in by the various actors. A guide on how to fill in the TIR Carnet is available to be downloaded free of charge from the IRU bookshop appropriate

55- تاريخ تصويب ، كاربستي شدن (اجراء / عملياتي شدن) پيمان هاي (Convention) زير و تاريخ پيوستن  دولت ايران را به اين پيمان ها بنويسيد.

1- 55- پيمان  (Convention) شوراي همكاري گمركي . ج1: دسامبر 1950/1959/1959

.

2- 55- پيمان  (Nomenclature Convention ) مشهور به (نمانكلاتور رده بندي كالا) ج2: 15 دسامبر 1950/1959/1959

Nomenclature: system of name classification in a specified field

.

3- 55- پيمان  (Convention) سامانه همآهنگ شده(HS) . ج3: ژانويه 1988/ ژانويه 1988/ 1996

.

4- 55- پيمان  (Convention) گمركي ورود موقت لوازم بسته بندي . ج4: 15 مارس 1962/15 مارس 1962/1968

.

5- 55- پيمان  (Convention) گمركي ورود موقت لوازم حرفه اي . ج5: 8 ژوئن 1961/1 ژوئيه 1962/1970

.

6- 55- پيمان گمركي آسان سازي ورود كالا براي نمايش يا استفاده در نمايشگاه ها ،‌بازار مكاره، نشست ها يا رويدادهاي همسان . ج6: ششم ژوئن 1961/13 ژوئيه 1962/1968

.

7- 55- پيمان  (Convention) وسايل رفاهي دريانوردان. ج7: يكم دسامبر 1964/11 دسامبر 1965/1968

.

8- 55- پيمان  (Convention) گمركي ورود موقت وسايل علمي. ج8: 11 ژوئن 1968/5 سپتامبر 1969/؟

.

9- 55- پيمان  (Convention) ورود موقت وسايل تعليم و تربيت. ج9: 8 ژوئن 1970/10 سپتامبر 1971/1972

.

10- 55- پيمان  (Convention) گمركي دفتر چه ورود موقت كالا (ATA Carnet § )  ج10: 6 دسامبر 1961/26 دسامبر 1962/1968

§Carnet: customs document that enables a motor vehicle to be driven across international borders at no cost; international customs document that make customs procedures easier for temporary importation of assorted types of merchandise.

.

11- 55- پيمان  (Convention) گمركي كمكهاي متقابل اداري براي پيشگيري ، بازرسي و پيگيري تخلفات گمركي (پيمان نايروبي). ج11: اكتبر 1977، بازنگري ها ژوئيه 1989، اكتبر 1995/؟/1996

.

12- 55 - پيمان  گمركي محفظه ها  (Container _Convention)   ج12: دسامبر 1972/؟

56- شوراي همكاري هاي گمركي را شرح دهيد.

57- سازمان جهاني گمرك را شرح دهيد.

58-سازمان بازرگاني جهاني را شرح دهيد.

59- بانك جهاني را شرح دهيد.

60- نقش وكاركرد حمل ونقل بين المللي را در ارتباط با ارزشگذاري كالا در گمرك و پرداخت حقوق و عوارض گمركي (حقوق ورودي و هزينه هاي انجام خدمات ) شرح دهيد.

آئين نامه اجرايي ماده 32 قانون تجارت الكترونيك

مصوبه ت : 1386/6/21

ماده 1-

در این آیین‌نامه، اصطلاحات زیر در معانی مشروح مربوط به کار می‌روند:

الف - قانون: قانون تجارت الکترونیک ـ مصوب ۱۳۸۲

ب - شورا: شورای ت‌گذاری گواهی الکترونیکی، موضوع ماده ۲ این آیین‌نامه

پ - مرکز ریشه: مرکز صدور گواهی الکترونیکی ریشه، موضوع بند (الف) ماده (۴) این آیین‌نامه

ت - مرکز میانی: مرکز صدور گواهی الکترونیکی میانی، موضوع بند ب ماده ۴ این آیین‌نامه است.

ث - دفاتر ثبت‌نام: دفتر ثبت‌نام گواهی الکترونیکی، موضوع بند پ ماده ۴ این آیین‌نامه

ج - گواهی الکترونیکی: داده الکترونیکی، حاوی اطلاعاتی در مورد مرکز صادرکننده گواهی مالک گواهی، تاریخ صدور و انقضا، کلید عمومی مالک و یک شماره‌سریال که توسط مرکز میانی تولیدشده به‌گونه‌ای که هر شخصی می‌تواند به صحت ارتباط بین کلید عمومی و مالک آن اعتماد کند.

چ - داده ایجاد امضای الکترونیکی: داده‌های انحصاری نظیر رمز یا کلید خصوصی که امضاکننده برای ایجاد امضای الکترونیکی از آن استفاده می‌کند.

ج - داده رسی امضای الکترونیکی: داده‌ای نظیر رمز یا کلید عمومی که برای بررسی و صحت امضای الکترونیکی مورداستفاده قرار می‌گیرد.

خ – زوج کلید یا داده‌های ایجاد و وارسی امضای الکترونیکی: کلید خصوصی وکلید عمومی مرتبط با آن در یک رمزنگاری نامتقارن

د – طرف اعتماد کننده: شخصی است که به اعتبار اطلاعات گواهی الکترونیکی اعتماد می‌کند.

ذ – مهر زمانی: اعلامیه‌ای شامل یک امضای الکترونیکی که به‌وسیله مرکز میانی صادرشده و تائید می‌کند که داده‌پیام معین در موقع خاصی به او ارائه‌شده است.

ر – مخزن: یک پایگاه داده ذخیره و انتشار گواهی‌های الکترونیکی و اطلاعات مربوط به آن‌ها جهت بهره‌برداری طرف‌های اعتماد کننده است.

ز – تجهیزات ایجاد و وارسی امضای الکترونیکی: نرم‌افزار و یا سخت‌افزاری که به‌منظور اجرای داده‌های مربوط به ایجاد و وارسی امضای الکترونیکی استفاده می‌شود.

ژ – ت‌های گواهی: مجموعه ت‌های گواهی الکترونیکی مشتمل بر ت‌ها، قوانین و مقررات و روش‌های فنی و حقوقی و ساختاری که مطابق با استانداردهای بین‌المللی تدوین‌شده و حداقل خواسته‌ها و اامات پیاده‌سازی مراکز صدور گواهی، دفاتر ثبت‌نام، صاحبان امضا و طرف‌های اعتماد کننده را مشخص می‌کند. تدوین این ت‌های گواهی برای مرکز ریشه اامی است و می‌تواند برای مرکز میانی به‌طور جداگانه تنظیم گردد.

س – دستورالعمل گواهی: مجموعه دستورالعمل‌هایی که منطبق با ت گواهی جهت تشریح جزئیات عملکرد مدیریت گواهی‌های الکترونیکی در مرکز ریشه و مراکز میانی تدوین می‌گردد.

ش – زیرساخت کلید عمومی: مجموعه‌ای از نرم‌افزارها، سخت‌افزارها، ت‌ها، فرآیندها روال‌های موردنیاز برای مدیریت گواهی‌ها و زوج کلیدها

ماده ۲-

به‌منظور حفظ یکپارچگی و ت‌گذاری در حوزه زیرساخت کلید عمومی کشور شورای ت‌گذاری گواهی الکترونیکی مرکب از اعضای زیر تشکیل می‌شود:

الف – وزیر بازرگانی یا معاون ذی‌ربط وی (رئیس)

ب – معاون ذی‌ربط وزیر دادگستری

پ – معاون ذی‌ربط وزیر اطلاعات ت – معاون ذی‌ربط وزیر ارتباطات و فناوری اطلاعات

ث – معاون ذی‌ربط وزیر امور اقتصادی و دارایی ج – معاون ذی‌ربط وزیر بهداشت، درمان و آموزش پزشکی چ – معاون ذی‌ربط معاونت برنامه‌ریزی و نظارت راهبردی رئیس‌جمهور

ح – معاون ذی‌ربط رئیس‌کل بانک مرکزی جمهوری اسلامی ایران

خ – رئیس اتاق بازرگانی و صنایع و معدن ایران

د – رئیس سازمان ثبت اسناد و املاک کشور

ذ – رئیس سازمان نظام صنفی رایانه‌ای ر- دبیر شورای عالی انفورماتیک

ز – دبیر شورای عالی فناوری اطلاعات

ژ – رئیس مرکز توسعه تجارت الکترونیکی وزارت بازرگانی به‌عنوان دبیر شورا (بدون حق رأی)

س- یک تا سه نفر مشاوره خبره با پیشنهاد رئیس و تائید اکثریت سایر اعضای شورا

ماده ۳-

وظایف شورا به شرح زیر تعیین می‌شود:

الف – بررسی ت‌های کلان و برنامه‌های مربوط به حوزه زیرساخت کلید عمومی کشور و ارائه آن به شورای عالی فناوری اطلاعات کشور جهت تصویب

ب – صدور مجوز ایجاد مرکز ریشه

پ- تصویب و به‌روزرسانی ت‌ها و دستورالعمل گواهی مراکز ریشه و میانی

ت – تصویب استانداردها، رویه‌ها و دستورالعمل‌های اجرای گواهی الکترونیکی

ث – ایفای نقش به‌عنوان مرجع هماهنگ‌کننده در مورد فعالیت حوزه‌های گوناگون اجرایی برای ارائه خدمات رایانه‌ای صدور گواهی مبتنی بر زیرساخت کلید عمومی و نحوه تعامل مراکز صدور گواهی داخلی با مرکز صدور گواهی خارجی و هرگونه تفسیر یا کاربردپذیری مفاد ت‌های گواهی ریشه و میانی ج – نظارت عالیه و بررسی گزارش عملکرد و تخلفات احتمالی مراکز ریشه و میانی و در صورت وم لغو مجوز آن‌ها

ماده ۴-

سطوح دفاتر خدمات صدور گواهی الکترونیکی موضوع ماده ۳۱ قانون به‌عنوان ارائه‌دهندگان خدمات گواهی الکترونیکی به شرح زیر تعیین می‌شوند:

الف – مرکز دولتی صدور گواهی الکترونیکی ریشه که با کسب مجوز از شورا فعالیت می‌نماید.

تبصره ۱- این مرکز وابسته به مرکز توسعه تجارت الکترونیکی، موضوع ماده (۸۰) قانون می‌باشد.

تبصره ۲- سیستم بانکی می‌تواند با اخذ مجوز شورا در حوزه نظام بانکی مرکز ریشه مستقل ایجاد نماید که در این صورت مرکز یادشده وابسته به مرکز توسعه تجارت الکترونیکی موضوع این ماده نخواهد بود.

ب – مرکز صدور گواهی الکترونیکی میانی که با کسب مجوز از یک مرکز ریشه، مبادرت به صدور گواهی الکترونیکی نموده و سایر خدمات مربوط به امضای الکترونیکی را انجام می‌دهد.

پ – دفتر ثبت‌نام گواهی الکترونیکی که با کسب مجوز از حداقل یک مرکز میانی نسبت به ثبت و انتقال درخواست متقاضیان در خصوص صدور و لغو گواهی‌ها و سایر امور مربوط به آن‌ها مطابق با ضوابط و دستورالعمل صادره از سوی مراکز میانی که تعهد همکاری با آن‌ها را امضا نموده است اقدام می‌نماید.

ماده ۵-

وظایف و مسئولیت‌های مرکز ریشه به شرح زیر تعیین می‌شوند:

الف – پیشنهاد ت‌ها و دستورالعمل گواهی مرکز ریشه و ارائه به شورا جهت تصویب

ب – اجرای ت‌ها و دستورالعمل‌های شورا

پ – بررسی و تصویب ت‌ها و دستورالعمل مراکز میانی

ت – بررسی و احراز شرایط لازم و صلاحیت متقاضیان ایجاد مراکز میانی و صدور مجوز برای آن‌ها

ث – حصول اطمینان از ثبت اطلاعات معتبر و مناسب در گواهی‌ها و نگهداری مدارک و شواهد دال بر صحت این اطلاعات

ج – حصول اطمینان از عملکرد صحیح مراکز میانی

چ – ابطال گواهی مراکز میانی که برخلاف تعهداتشان عمل کرده‌اند.

ح – اطلاع رسنی به صاحبان امضا و طرف‌های اعتماد کننده در مورد هرگونه تغییر در کارکرد مرکز میانی خ – ایجاد و به‌روزرسانی یک مخزن بر خط و اطلاع‌رسانی خدمات آن. 

ماده ۶-

مرکز ریشه به‌محض قطع عملیات مرکز میانی و زمانی که فعالیت این مرکز به‌موجب حکم مراجع قضایی و یا دلیل دیگری متوقف شود و همچنین و در صورت لغو مجوز مرکز میانی باید به روش مندرج در بند (خ) ماده (۵) این آیین‌نامه و درج در رومه رسمی جمهوری اسلامی ایران فهرست گواهی‌های باطل‌شده را منتشر نماید. تبصره ـ مسئولیت و نحوه پرداخت خسارت بابت ضرر و زیان ناشی از ابطال مرکز میانی به صاحبان امضای الکترونیکی صادرشده از این مرکز و یا به دفاتر ثبت‌نام باید در دستورالعمل گواهی الکترونیکی مرکز و یا در قرارداد منعقدشده بین طرفین قیدشده باشد.

ماده ۷ ـ

مراکز میانی حسب مورد توسط دستگاه‌های دولتی یا بخش غیردولتی ایجاد می‌شوند و شرایط و ضوابط تأسیس مراکز میانی به شرح زیر تعیین می‌شود:

الف ـ ارائه اساسنامه یا مجوز ثبت از مراجع ذی‌ربط

ب ـ ارائه تقاضا از طرف متقاضی پ ـ معرفی پنج نفر دارای مدرک تحصیلی مرتبط مورد تائید وزارتخانه‌های علوم، تحقیقات و فناوری و بهداشت، درمان و آموزش پزشکی با شرایط زیر: سه نفر کارشناس دارای مدرک تحصیلی دانشگاهی و ترجیحاً دارای تجربه فعالیت مرتبط. دو نفر با مدرک کاردانی در رشته‌های مرتبط با فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات یا حداقل سه سال تجربه در حوزه‌های مرتبط با فناوری اطلاعات و ارتباطات همراه با مجوز طی دوره آموزشی از مراکز فنی و حرفه‌ای

ت ـ تأمین مکان فیزیکی مناسب همراه با تجهیزات سخت‌افزاری و نرم‌افزاری لازم اعلام‌شده از سوی مرکز ریشه به‌نحوی‌که امنیت فنی و رمزنگاری را تضمین نماید و مورد تائید بازرسان مرکز ریشه قرارگرفته باشد.

ث ـ ارائه تضمین معتبر متناسب با مبلغ تعیین‌شده توسط مرکز ریشه

ج ـ تدوین ت‌ها و دستورالعمل گواهی مرکز

تبصره ۱ ـ مراکز ریشه مکلف‌اند ظرف دو ماه نسبت به بررسی تقاضا اقدام و نتیجه را به متقاضیان اعلام نمایند.

تبصره ۲ ـ مراکز میانی ایجادشده توسط سازمان‌های دولتی به‌صورت غیرانتفاعی فعالیت خواهند نمود.

تبصره ۳ ـ مراکز میانی دولتی از ابتدای سال ۱۳۸۸ مجاز به ارائه خدمات گواهی الکترونیکی به بخش‌های غیردولتی خارج از حوزه فعالیت خود نمی‌باشند.

تبصره ۴ ـ اشخاصی که مجوز راه‌اندازی مرکز میانی را با ملاحظه شرایط این ماده اخذ می‌نمایند مکلف‌اند ظرف شش ماه از تاریخ صدور مجوز نسبت به تأسیس مرکز اقدام نمایند. در غیر این صورت مجوز ایشان لغو شده تلقی می‌گردد.

ماده ۸ ـ

مراکز میانی در حین فعالیت با رعایت مفاد دستورالعمل گواهی، وظایف زیر را به عهده خواهند داشت:

الف ـ بررسی صلاحیت و صدور مجوز برای دفاتر ثبت‌نام ذی‌ربط

ب ـ تضمین ارائه خدمات صدور و لغو گواهی‌ها به‌صورت مطمئن پ ـ تضمین ارائه خدمات تائید صحت گواهی‌ها به‌صورت سریع و مطمئن

ت ـ تضمین محرمانه بودن داده‌های مربوط به امضا در فرآیند ایجاد این داده‌ها برای جلوگیری از شبیه‌سازی گواهی‌ها

ث ـ حصول اطمینان نسبت به موارد زیر: در لحظه صدور گواهی الکترونیکی، اطلاعات مندرج در گواهی‌ها صحیح باشند. در هنگام صدور گواهی الکترونیکی، امضاکننده مشخص‌شده در گواهی، داده‌های ایجاد و وارسی امضای الکترونیکی را دریافت نموده و داده ایجاد امضای الکترونیکی تحت کنترل انحصاری وی باشد. کلیه اطلاعات مرتبط با گواهی الکترونیکی را تا مدت‌زمان تعیین‌شده در دستورالعمل گواهی به‌صورت الکترونیکی حفظ نماید تاریخ و ساعت صدور و لغو یک گواهی به‌دقت تعیین‌شده و قابل‌تشخیص باشد. عدم کپی یا ذخیره داده ایجاد امضای الکترونیکی متقاضیان را تضمین نماید.

گواهی قابل‌دسترسی برای عموم نباشد، جز در مواردی که صاحبان گواهی‌ها رضایت خود را اعلام کرده‌اند یا نوع گواهی انتشار عمومی را ایجاب نماید. در صورت امکان مرکز میانی و با دریافت درخواست دفتر ثبت‌نام، یک مهر زمانی به داده‌های الکترونیکی ضمیمه شود

تبصره ۱ ـ هر مرکز میانی موظف است فهرستی از گواهی‌هایی را که توسط آن مرکز صادر می‌شود با ذکر تاریخ صدور، نام صاحب گواهی و نوع گواهی تهیه و منتشر نماید. اطلاعات مزبور باید در جایگاه اینترنتی مربوط درج گردد.

تبصره ۲ ـ مرکز میانی بر عملکرد دفاتر ثبت‌نام طرف قرارداد خود نظارت داشته و در صورت احراز تخلف طبق ضوابط با آن برخورد کرده و در صورت وم با رعایت تمهیدات پیش‌بینی‌شده در دستورالعمل گواهی نسبت به لغو مجوز دفتر ثبت‌نام متخلف اقدام خواهد نمود.

ماده ۹ ـ

مجوز مراکز میانی به‌طور ادواری، مطابق با ت‌های گواهی و با ملاحظه شرایط و تحولات فناوری‌های جدید و پس از احراز مجدد صلاحیت متقاضیان، توسط مرکز ریشه قابل تمدید می‌باشد.

ماده ۱۰ ـ

مجوز مراکز میانی صرفاً با تائید مرکز ریشه با ملاحظه شرایط مقرر در این آیین‌نامه و دستورالعمل گواهی قابل واگذاری به غیر خواهد بود.

ماده ۱۱ ـ

کلیه مؤسسات اعم از دولتی یا غیردولتی می‌توانند در حوزه فعالیت داخلی خود بدون اخذ مجوز از مرکز ریشه مبادرت به ثبت و صدور گواهی نمایند. گواهی‌هایی که به این صورت صادر می‌شود خارج از شمول مقررات این آیین‌نامه بوده و امضاهایی که به‌وسیله این گواهی‌ها تائید می‌شوند خارج از موضوع ماده (۱۰) قانون و صرفاً قابل استفاده در همان مؤسسات خواهد بود.

ماده ۱۲ ـ

دفاتر ثبت‌نام می‌توانند بنا به مورد توسط اشخاص حقیقی یا حقوقی اعم از دولتی یا غیردولتی ایجاد شوند. اشخاص حقیقی و نیز صاحبان اشخاص حقوقی متقاضی دریافت مجوز راه‌اندازی دفاتر ثبت‌نام در کشور باید دارای شرایط زیر باشند:

الف ـ تابعیت جمهوری اسلامی ایران

ب ـ تدین و عاملیت به احکام اسلام یا پیروی از ادیان به رسمیت شناخته‌شده در قانون اساسی

پ ـ نداشتن پیشینه کیفری

ت ـ عدم تجاهر به فسق و داشتن صلاحیت اخلاقی و حسن سابقه

ث ـ عدم اعتیاد به مواد مخدر ج ـ انجام خدمت وظیفه عمومی یا معافیت دائم

چ ـ دارا بودن حداقل مدرک کاردانی مورد تائید وزارتخانه‌های علوم، تحقیقات و فناوری و بهداشت، درمان و آموزش پزشکی ح ـ ارائه ضمانت معتبر

خ ـ داشتن سابقه کار حداقل سه سال متوالی یا پنج سال متناوب مورد تائید مرکز میانی در بخش‌های مرتبط با فناوری اطلاعات

تبصره ۱ ـ نوع و میزان ضمنان معتبر بر اساس دستورالعمل دفاتر صدور گواهی الکترونیکی میانی پیش‌بینی می‌شود.

تبصره ۲ ـ شعب بانک‌ها به‌عنوان دفاتر ثبت‌نام مراکز میانی تحت نظارت مرکز ریشه نظام بانکی از شمول این ماده و ماده (۱۴) مستثنا هستند.

تبصره ۳ ـ اشخاصی که مبادرت به اخذ مجوز راه‌اندازی دفتر ثبت با ملاحظه شرایط این ماده می‌نمایند مکلف‌اند ظرف چهار ماه از تاریخ صدور مجوز نسبت به تأسیس دفتر اقدام نمایند. در غیر این صورت مجوز مذکور لغو شده تلقی می‌گردد.

تبصره ۴ ـ متقاضی تأسیس دفتر ثبت‌نام موظف به تأمین مکان فیزیکی مناسب مطابق دستورالعمل گواهی میانی طرف قرارداد و تهیه و نصب تابلو با درج شماره مجوز دریافتی از مرکز یا مراکز میانی طرف قرارداد می‌باشد.

ماده ۱۳ ـ

وظایف دفاتر ثبت‌نام به شرح زیر می‌باشد:

الف ـ انجام عملیات مطابق با دستورالعمل گواهی مرکز میانی مربوط

ب ـ احراز هویت و تصدیق مدارک ارائه‌شده متقاضی دریافت خدمات گواهی

پ ـ ارسال درخواست متقاضی همراه با مدرک مربوطه به مرکز میانی مربوط

ت ـ دریافت گواهی صادرشده از مرکز میانی مربوطه و تحویل به متقاضی

ماده ۱۴-

مجوز دفاتر ثبت‌نام حداکثر برای سه سال صادر می‌شود. این مجوز مطابق با دستورالعمل گواهی میانی و با لحاظ شرایط و تحولات فناوری‌های نوین پس از احراز صلاحیت متقاضیان توسط مراکز میانی قابل تمدید خواهد بود.

ماده ۱۵ -

دفاتر ثبت‌نام موظف‌اند هنگام ثبت‌نام متقاضی گواهی الکترونیکی، امضای شخص را برای صحت اطلاعات ارائه‌شده (املایی و محتوایی) اخذ نموده و وی را از نحوه و شرایط دقیق استفاده از گواهی‌ها، ازجمله محدودیت‌های حاکم بر استفاده، خدمات و شیوه‌های طرح و پیگیری دعوی مطابق ت‌ها و دستورالعمل گواهی میانی آگاه سازند.

ماده ۱۶ -

حق‌الثبت دفاتر ثبت‌نام، بر اساس نوع گواهی و خدمات ارائه‌شده به متقاضیان با رعایت مقررات بر اساس تعرفه‌ای که بنا به پیشنهاد شورا به تصویب هیئت‌وزیران می‌رسد تعیین می‌شود.

ماده ۱۷ -

به‌منظور حفظ محرمانه بودن و غیرقابل دستیابی بودن داده‌های ایجاد امضای الکترونیکی از طریق استنتاج، مراکز میانی مکلف‌اند از تجهیزات و روش‌هایی استفاده کنند که داده‌های ایجاد امضای الکترونیکی مورداستفاده برای امضای الکترونیکی بیش از یک‌بار استفاده‌نشده و در مقابل هرگونه شبیه‌سازی از طریق ابزارهای فنی محافظت و در برابر استفاده آن توسط اشخاص ثالث به نحوه اطمینان بخشی محافظت شوند. تبصره ـ این تجهیزات و روش‌ها نباید داده‌های لازم برای امضا را تغییر دهد و باید تضمین نماید که این داده‌ها قبل از طی فرآیند امضا در اختیار امضاکننده قرار نگیرد.

ماده ۱۸ ـ

اعتبار و پذیرش گواهی الکترونیکی صادره از مراجع صدور گواهی خارجی، مشروط به توافق دوجانبه بین مرکز ریشه کشور و مرجع صدور گواهی کشور خارجی با رعایت اصل شرط عمل متقابل و تصویب شورا خواهد بود.

ماده ۱۹ ـ

در موارد زیر با حفظ سوابق موجود، گواهی الکترونیکی توسط مرکز میانی صادرکننده آن، ابطال می‌شود:

الف ـ درخواست ابطال توسط صاحب گواهی الکترونیکی و یا وکیل قانونی وی.

ب ـ تخطی صاحب گواهی الکترونیکی از تعهداتش.

پ ـ احراز صدور گواهی مبتنی بر اظهارات دروغ و اشتباهات متقاضی

ت ـ مشاهده تخلف صاحب گواهی و یا دفاتر ثبت‌نام و مرکز میانی از مندرجات این آیین‌نامه. در این صورت مرکز ریشه دستور ابطال گواهی را صادر نماید.

ث ـ احراز صدور گواهی الکترونیکی که شامل اطلاعات شخص ثالث بوده و گواهی بدون رضایت وی صادرشده باشد.

ج ـ افشای کلید خصوصی نزد سایر افراد غیرمجاز

ماده ۲۰ ـ

تمامی دستگاه‌های اجرایی مکلف‌اند مطابق برنامه زمان‌بندی‌شده ظرف دو سال از زمان ابلاغ این آیین‌نامه فناوری امضای الکترونیکی مطمئن را در فعالیت‌ها و فرایندهای الکترونیکی حوزه عملکرد خود و سازمان‌های تابعه مورداستفاده قرار دهند و گزارش عملکرد خود را هر شش (۶) ماه یکبار به کمیسیون امور اجتماعی و دولت الکترونیک ارائه نمایند. این مصوبه در تاریخ 86/6/21 با شماره ۹۸۹۸۶/ت ۳۱۸۱۹ هـ از سوی معاون اول رئیس‌جمهور برای اجرا ابلاغ شده است.

  خاني چهري محمد كرمانشاه

تبار شناسي جامعه شناختي اسيب شناسي  تمدن ها ايران ، بين النهرين ، غرب

 conflict   يا برخورد   discussion گفتمان 

Samul P Huntington The clash of civilization

THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT

World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be-the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.

Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of Westphalia[1], the conflicts of the Western world were largely among princes-emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs attempting to expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mercantilist economic strength and, most important, the territory they ruled.

In the process they created nation states, and beginning with the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth-century pattern lasted until the end of World War I. Then, as a result of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of nations yielded to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism, fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between communism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, neither of which was a nation state in the classical European sense and each of which defined its identity in terms of its ideology.

These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies were primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars," as William Lind has labeled them. This was as true of the Cold War as it was of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the end of the Cold War, international politics moves out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilizations no longer remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonialism but join the West as movers and shapers of history.

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS

During the cold war the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.

What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity. The culture of a village in southern Italy may be different from that of a village in northern Italy, but both will share in a common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German villages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs, Chinese and Westerners, however, are not part of any broader cultural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity: a resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of intensity as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a European, a Westerner. The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and boundaries of civilizations change.

Civilizations may involve a large number of people, as with China ("a civilization pretending to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilizations. Western civilization has two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom sharp, they are real. Civilizations are dynamic; they rise and fall; they divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations disappear and are buried in the sands of time.

Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs. They have been that, however, for only a few centuries. The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations. In A Study of History, Arnold Toynbee identified 21 major civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.

WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH

Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another.

Why will this be the case?

First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.

Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptivity to immigration by "good'' European Catholic Poles. Americans react far more negatively to Japanese investment than to larger investments from Canada and European countries. Similarly, as Donald Horowitz has pointed out, "An Ibo may be . an Owerri Ibo or an Onitsha Ibo in what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he is simply an Ibo. In London, he is a Nigerian. In New York, he is an African." The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching or thought to stretch back deep into history.

Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has remarked, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twentieth century." The revival of religion, "la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.

Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. Increasingly one hears references to trends toward a turning inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and the "Hinduization" of India, the failure of Western ideas of socialism and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of the Middle East, and now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris Yeltsin's country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.

In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were usually the people who were most involved with the West, had been educated at Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western attitudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture. Now, however, these relationships are being reversed. A de-Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring in many non-Western countries at the same time that Western, usually American, cultures, styles and habits become more popular among the mass of the people.

Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians cannot become Estonians and Azeris cannot become Armenians. In class and ideological conflicts, the key question was "Which side are you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are you?" That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.

Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of total trade that were intraregional rose between 1980 and 1989 from 51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent in North America. The importance of regional economic blocs is likely to continue to increase in the future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization. The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity. The success of the North American Free Trade Area depends on the convergence now underway of Mexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in contrast, faces difficulties in creating a comparable economic entity in East Asia because Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself. However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop with other East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional economic integration like that in Europe and North America.

Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cultural commonalities increasingly overcome ideological differences, and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray Weidenbaum has observed,

Despite the current Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based economy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter for industry, commerce and finance. This strategic area contains substantial amounts of technology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing and services acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network (Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very large endowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China) From Guangzhou to Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila, this influential network-often based on extensions of the traditional clans-has been described as the backbone of the East Asian economy.

Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization, founded originally in the 1960s by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had no chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly, Caricom, the Central American Common Market and Mercosur rest on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo-Latin divide, however, have to date failed.

As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion. The end of ideologically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come to the fore. Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most important, the efforts of the West to promote its values of democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its economic interests engender countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.

The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro- level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political and religious values.

THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS

The fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other, has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe, as William Wallace has suggested, may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500. This line runs along what are now the boundaries between Finland and Russia and between the Baltic states and Russia, cuts through Belarus and Ukraine separating the more Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox eastern Ukraine, swings westward separating Transylvania from the rest of Romania, and then goes through Yugoslavia almost exactly along the line now separating Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of course, coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. The peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experiences of European history-feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution; they are generally economically better off than the peoples to the east; and they may now look forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of democratic political systems. The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems. The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events in Yugoslavia show, it is not only a line of difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict.

Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilizations has been going on for 1,300 years. After the founding of Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the Crusaders attempted with temporary success to bring Christianity and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and twice laid siege to Vienna. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as Ottoman power declined Britain, France, and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and the Middle East.

After World War II, the West, in turn, began to retreat; the colonial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic fundamentalism manifested themselves; the West became heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to, weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (created by the West). France fought a bloody and ruthless war in Algeria for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egypt in 1956; American forces went into Lebanon in 1958; subsequently American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists, supported by at least three Middle Eastern governments, employed the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations and seized Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. In its aftermath NATO planning is increasingly directed to potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."

This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had attacked Israel and stood up to the West. It also left many feeling humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the Persian Gulf, the West's overwhelming military dominance, and their apparent inability to shape their own destiny. Many Arab countries, in addition to the oil exporters, are reaching levels of economic and social development where autocratic forms of government become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic countries and the West.

Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spectacular population growth in Arab countries, particularly in North Africa, has led to increased migration to Western Europe. The movement within Western Europe toward minimizing internal boundaries has sharpened political sensitivities with respect to this development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is increasingly open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish migrants have become more intense and more widespread since 1990.

On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. The West's "next confrontation," observes M. J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion:

We are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations-the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.

Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now increasingly Christian black peoples to the south. In the past, this antagonism was epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa, and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. The modernization of Africa and the spread of Christianity are likely to enhance the probability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the intensification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul II's speech in Khartoum in February 1993 attacking the actions of the Sudan's Islamist government against the Christian minority there.

On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupted between Orthodox and Muslim peoples, including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo, the simmering violence between Serb and Albanian, the tenuous relations between Bulgarians and their Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and Ingush, the unremitting slaughter of each other by Armenians and Azeris, the tense relations between Russians and Muslims in Central Asia, and the deployment of Russian troops to protect Russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their southern borders. This concern is well captured by Archie Roosevelt:

Much of Russian history concerns the struggle between the Slavs and the Turkic peoples on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs' millennium-long confrontation with their eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding not only of Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian realities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries.

The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere in Asia. The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent manifests itself now not only in the rivalry between Pakistan and India but also in intensifying religious strife within India between increasingly militant Hindu groups and India's substantial Muslim minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992 brought to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular democratic state or become a Hindu one. In East Asia, China has outstanding territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. It has pursued a ruthless policy toward the Buddhist people of Tibet, and it is pursuing an increasingly ruthless policy toward its Turkic-Muslim minority. With the Cold War over, the underlying differences between China and the United States have reasserted themselves in areas such as human rights, trade and weapons proliferation. These differences are unlikely to moderate. A "new cold war," Deng Xaioping reportedly asserted in 1991, is under way between China and America.

The same phrase has been applied to the increasingly difficult relations between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference exacerbates economic conflict. People on each side allege racism on the other, but at least on the American side the antipathies are not racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of the two societies could hardly be more different. The economic issues between the United States and Europe are no less serious than those between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the same political salience and emotional intensity because the differences between American culture and European culture are so much less than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.

The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to which they are likely to be characterized by violence. Economic competition clearly predominates between the American and European subcivilizations of the West and between both of them and Japan. On the Eurasian continent, however, the proliferation of ethnic conflict, epitomized at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing," has not been totally random. It has been most frequent and most violent between groups belonging to different civilizations. In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders.

CIVILIZATION RALLYING: THE KIN-COUNTRY SYNDROME

Groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization. As the post-Cold War world evolves, civilization commonality, what H. D. S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome, is replacing political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can be seen gradually emerging in the post-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilizational rallying, which seemed to become more important as the conflict continued and which may provide a foretaste of the future.

First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then fought a coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While only a few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many Arab elites privately cheered him on, and he was highly popular among large sections of the Arab publics. Islamic fundamentalist movements universally supported Iraq rather than the Western-backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Forswearing Arab nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal. He and his supporters attempted to define the war as a war between civilizations. "It is not the world against Iraq," as Safar Al-Hawali, dean of Islamic Studies at the Umm Al-Qura University in Mecca, put it in a widely circulated tape. "It is the West against Islam." Ignoring the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for a holy war against the West: "The struggle against American aggression, greed, plans and policies will be counted as a jihad, and anybody who is killed on that path is a martyr." "This is a war," King Hussein of Jordan argued, "against all Arabs and all Muslims and not against Iraq alone."

The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publics behind Saddam Hussein caused those Arab governments in the anti-Iraq coalition to moderate their activities and temper their public statements. Arab governments opposed or distanced themselves from subsequent Western efforts to apply pressure on Iraq, including enforcement of a no-fly zone in the summer of 1992 and the bombing of Iraq in January 1993. The Western-Soviet-Turkish-Arab anti-Iraq coalition of 1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost only the West and Kuwait against Iraq.

Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with the West's failure to protect Bosnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on Israel for violating U.N. resolutions. The West, they alleged, was using a double standard. A world of clashing civilizations, however, is inevitably a world of double standards: people apply one standard to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.

Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in the former Soviet Union. Armenian military successes in 1992 and 1993 stimulated Turkey to become increasingly supportive of its religious, ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan. "We have a Turkish nation feeling the same sentiments as the Azerbaijanis," said one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our newspapers are full of the photos of atrocities and are asking us if we are still serious about pursuing our neutral policy. Maybe we should show Armenia that there's a big Turkey in the region." President Turgut Özal agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the Armenians a little bit." Turkey, Özal threatened again in 1993, would "show its fangs." Turkish Air Force jets flew reconnaissance flights along the Armenian border; Turkey suspended food shipments and air flights to Armenia; and Turkey and Iran announced they would not accept dismemberment of Azerbaijan. In the last years of its existence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan because its government was dominated by former communists. With the end of the Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way to religious ones. Russian troops fought on the side of the Armenians, and Azerbaijan accused the "Russian government of turning 0 degrees" toward support for Christian Armenia.

Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs. Relatively little concern was expressed, however, over Croatian attacks on Muslims and participation in the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav breakup, Germany, in an unusual display of diplomatic initiative and muscle, induced the other 11 members of the European Community to follow its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the pope's determination to provide strong backing to the two Catholic countries, the Vatican extended recognition even before the Community did. The United States followed the European lead. Thus the leading actors in Western civilization rallied behind their coreligionists. Subsequently Croatia was reported to be receiving substantial quantities of arms from Central European and other Western countries. Boris Yeltsin's government, on the other hand, attempted to pursue a middle course that would be sympathetic to the Orthodox Serbs but not alienate Russia from the West. Russian conservative and nationalist groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the government for not being more forthcoming in its support for the Serbs. By early 1993 several hundred Russians apparently were serving with the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of Russian arms being supplied to Serbia.

Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the West for not coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders urged Muslims from all countries to provide help to Bosnia; in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, Iran supplied weapons and men for the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese groups sent guerrillas to train and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims from over two dozen Islamic countries were reported to be fighting in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other countries felt under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own societies to provide more vigorous support for the Bosnians. By the end of 1992, Saudi Arabia had reportedly supplied substantial funding for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, which significantly increased their military capabilities vis-à-vis the Serbs.

In the 1930s the Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from countries that politically were fascist, communist and democratic. In the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict is provoking intervention from countries that are Muslim, Orthodox and Western Christian. The parallel has not gone unnoticed. "The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has become the emotional equivalent of the fight against fascism in the Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those who died there are regarded as martyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."

Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups within the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are likely to be less intense and less likely to expand than conflicts between civilizations. Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability of violence in situations where it might otherwise occur. In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for conflict, the leaders of the two countries were effectively negotiating and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and much tension and some fighting between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there has been virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainians.

Civilization rallying to date has been limited, but it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential to spread much further. As the conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly were along civilizational lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders and the media have found it a potent means of arousing mass support and of pressuring hesitant governments. In the coming years, the local conflicts most likely to escalate into major wars will be those, as in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civilizations. The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.

THE WEST VERSUS THE REST

The west is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, the West faces no economic challenge. It dominates international political and security institutions and with Japan international economic institutions. Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world economic issues by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan, all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other to the exclusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries. Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of the West are presented to the world as reflecting the desires of the world community. The very phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collective noun (replacing "the Free World") to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.› Through the IMF and other international economic institutions, the West promotes its economic interests and imposes on other nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. In any poll of non-Western peoples, the IMF undoubtedly would win the support of finance ministers and a few others, but get an overwhelmingly unfavorable rating from just about everyone else, who would agree with Georgy Arbatov's characterization of IMF officials as "neo-Bolsheviks who love expropriating other people's money, imposing undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political conduct and stifling economic freedom."

Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its decisions, tempered only by occasional abstention by China, produced U.N. legitimation of the West's use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait and its elimination of Iraq's sophisticated weapons and capacity to produce such weapons. It also produced the quite unprecedented action by the United States, Britain and France in getting the Security Council to demand that Libya hand over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and then to impose sanctions when Libya refused. After defeating the largest Arab army, the West did not hesitate to throw its weight around in the Arab world. The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values.

That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new world, and there is a significant element of truth in their view. Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and institutional power are thus one source of conflict between the West and other civilizations. Differences in culture, that is basic values and beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S. Naipaul has argued that Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men." At a superficial level much of Western culture has indeed permeated the rest of the world. At a more basic level, however, Western concepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations. Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by the younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion that there could be a "universal civilization" is a Western idea, directly at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their emphasis on what distinguishes one people from another. Indeed, the author of a review of 100 comparative studies of values in different societies concluded that "the values that are most important in the West are least important worldwide." In the political realm, of course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the United States and other Western powers to induce other peoples to adopt Western ideas concerning democracy and human rights. Modern democratic government originated in the West. When it has developed in non-Western societies it has usually been the product of Western colonialism or imposition.

The central axis of world politics in the future is likely to be, in Kishore Mahbubani's phrase, the conflict between "the West and the Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations to Western power and values. Those responses generally take one or a combination of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to insulate their societies from penetration or "corruption" by the West, and, in effect, to opt out of participation in the Western-dominated global community. The costs of this course, however, are high, and few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equivalent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, is to attempt to join the West and accept its values and institutions. The third alternative is to attempt to "balance" the West by developing economic and military power and cooperating with other non-Western societies against the West, while preserving indigenous values and institutions; in short, to modernize but not to Westernize.

THE TORN COUNTRIES

In the future, as people differentiate themselves by civilization, countries with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, are candidates for dismemberment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homogeneity but are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilization or another. These are torn countries. Their leaders typically wish to pursue a bandwagoning strategy and to make their countries members of the West, but the history, culture and traditions of their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypical torn country is Turkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey have followed in the Attatürk tradition and defined Turkey as a modern, secular, Western nation state. They allied Turkey with the West in NATO and in the Gulf War; they applied for membership in the European Community. At the same time, however, elements in Turkish society have supported an Islamic revival and have argued that Turkey is basically a Middle Eastern Muslim society. In addition, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey as such. Turkey will not become a member of the European Community, and the real reason, as President Özal said, "is that we are Muslim and they are Christian and they don't say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous efforts to carve out this new identity for itself.

During the past decade Mexico has assumed a position somewhat similar to that of Turkey. Just as Turkey abandoned its historic opposition to Europe and attempted to join Europe, Mexico has stopped defining itself by its opposition to the United States and is instead attempting to imitate the United States and to join it in the North American Free Trade Area. Mexican leaders are engaged in the great task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fundamental economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental political change. In 1991 a top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de Gortari described at length to me all the changes the Salinas government was making. When he finished, I remarked: "That's most impressive. It seems to me that basically you want to change Mexico from a Latin American country into a North American country." He looked at me with surprise and exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely what we are trying to do, but of course we could never say so publicly." As his remark indicates, in Mexico as in Turkey, significant elements in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity. In Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to Islam (Özal's pilgrimage to Mecca); so also Mexico's North American-oriented leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico to be a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara summit).

Historically Turkey has been the most profoundly torn country. For the United States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country. Globally the most important torn country is Russia. The question of whether Russia is part of the West or the leader of a distinct Slavic-Orthodox civilization has been a recurring one in Russian history. That issue was obscured by the communist victory in Russia, which imported a Western ideology, adapted it to Russian conditions and then challenged the West in the name of that ideology. The dominance of communism shut off the historic debate over Westernization versus Russification. With communism discredited Russians once again face that question.

President Yeltsin is adopting Western principles and goals and seeking to make Russia a "normal" country and a part of the West. Yet both the Russian elite and the Russian public are divided on this issue. Among the more moderate dissenters, Sergei Stankevich argues that Russia should reject the "Atlanticist" course, which would lead it "to become European, to become a part of the world economy in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of the Seven, and to put particular emphasis on Germany and the United States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." While also rejecting an exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless argues that Russia should give priority to the protection of Russians in other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections, and promote "an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our options, our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern direction." People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinating Russia's interests to those of the West, for reducing Russian military strength, for failing to support traditional friends such as Serbia, and for pushing economic and political reform in ways injurious to the Russian people. Indicative of this trend is the new popularity of the ideas of Petr Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a unique Eurasian civilization.‡ More extreme dissidents voice much more blatantly nationalist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and urge Russia to redevelop its military strength and to establish closer ties with China and Muslim countries. The people of Russia are as divided as the elite. An opinion survey in European Russia in the spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positive attitudes toward the West and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it has been for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s is truly a torn country.

To redefine its civilization identity, a torn country must meet three requirements. First, its political and economic elite has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its public has to be willing to acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to be willing to embrace the convert. All three requirements in large part exist with respect to Mexico. The first two in large part exist with respect to Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with respect to Russia's joining the West. The conflict between liberal democracy and Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their major differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equality and prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia could have quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually impossible for him to do that with a Russian traditionalist. If, as the Russians stop behaving like Marxists, they reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like Russians but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West could again become distant and conflictual.

THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION

The obstacles to non-Western countries joining the West vary considerably. They are least for Latin American and East European countries. They are greater for the Orthodox countries of the former Soviet Union. They are still greater for Muslim, Confucian, Hindu and Buddhist societies. Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions. Those countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or cannot, join the West compete with the West by developing their own economic, military and political power. They do this by promoting their internal development and by cooperating with other non-Western countries. The most prominent form of this cooperation is the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged to challenge Western interests, values and power.

Almost without exception, Western countries are reducing their military power; under Yeltsin's leadership so also is Russia. China, North Korea and several Middle Eastern states, however, are significantly expanding their military capabilities. They are doing this by the import of arms from Western and non-Western sources and by the development of indigenous arms industries. One result is the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called "Weapon States," and the Weapon States are not Western states. Another result is the redefinition of arms control, which is a Western concept and a Western goal. During the Cold War the primary purpose of arms control was to establish a stable military balance between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms control is to prevent the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts to do this through international agreements, economic pressure and controls on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.

The conflict between the West and the Confucian-Islamic states focuses largely, although not exclusively, on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal. The West promotes nonproliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and inspections as means of realizing that norm. It also threatens a variety of sanctions against those who promote the spread of sophisticated weapons and proposes some benefits for those who do not. The attention of the West focuses, naturally, on nations that are actually or potentially hostile to the West.

The non-Western nations, on the other hand, assert their right to acquire and to deploy whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. They also have absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the Indian defense minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf War: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are viewed, probably erroneously, as the potential equalizer of superior Western conventional power. China, of course, already has nuclear weapons; Pakistan and India have the capability to deploy them. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be attempting to acquire them. A top Iranian official has declared that all Muslim states should acquire nuclear weapons, and in 1988 the president of Iran reportedly issued a directive calling for development of "offensive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons."

Centrally important to the development of counter-West military capabilities is the sustained expansion of China's military power and its means to create military power. Buoyed by spectacular economic development, China is rapidly increasing its military spending and vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed forces. It is purchasing weapons from the former Soviet states; it is developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested a one-megaton nuclear device. It is developing power-projection capabilities, acquiring aerial refueling technology, and trying to purchase an aircraft carrier. Its military buildup and assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea are provoking a multilateral regional arms race in East Asia. China is also a major exporter of arms and weapons technology. It has exported materials to Libya and Iraq that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas. It has helped Algeria build a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production. China has sold to Iran nuclear technology that American officials believe could only be used to create weapons and apparently has shipped components of 300-mile-range missiles to Pakistan. North Korea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while and has sold advanced missiles and missile technology to Syria and Iran. The flow of weapons and weapons technology is generally from East Asia to the Middle East. There is, however, some movement in the reverse direction; China has received Stinger missiles from Pakistan.

A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being, designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military power of the West. It may or may not last. At present, however, it is, as Dave McCurdy has said, "a renegades' mutual support pact, run by the proliferators and their backers." A new form of arms competition is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and the West. In an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to balance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form of arms competition, one side is developing its arms and the other side is attempting not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms build-up while at the same time reducing its own military capabilities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

This article does not argue that civilization identities will replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each civilization will become a single coherent political entity, that groups within a civilization will not conflict with and even fight each other. This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict; international relations, historically a game played out within Western civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game in which non-Western civilizations are actors and not simply objects; successful political, security and economic international institutions are more likely to develop within civilizations than across civilizations; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more frequent, more sustained and more violent than conflicts between groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in different civilizations are the most likely and most dangerous source of escalation that could lead to global wars; the paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between "the West and the Rest"; the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their countries part of the West, but in most cases face major obstacles to accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states.

This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civilizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypotheses as to what the future may be like. If these are plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary to consider their implications for Western policy. These implications should be divided between short-term advantage and long-term accommodation. In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civilization, particularly between its European and North American components; to incorporate into the West societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and Japan; to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction of Western military capabilities and maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia; to exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups sympathetic to Western values and interests; to strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in those institutions.

In the longer term other measures would be called for. Western civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations have attempted to become modern without becoming Western. To date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civilizations will continue to attempt to acquire the wealth, technology, skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to the West will increase. Hence the West will increasingly have to accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power approaches that of the West but whose values and interests differ significantly from those of the West. This will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to these civilizations. It will also, however, require the West to develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests. It will require an effort to identify elements of commonality between Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.